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LECTURE
THE SETTLEMENT BLACK BOX*
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.**
The proposed settlements in major asbestos class action proceedings
have inspired intensive questioning of the lawyer's role in the negotiation
of settlements. The essential question is whether more effective controls
can be imposed on lawyers negotiating settlements for claimants, particu-
larly personal injury claimants, without infringing on the client's right to
confidentiality or impairing the client's bargaining position. Additional
complexities arise when a class is involved, because the class members
ordinarily cannot participate or consent in the same way as clients who
are individually represented. Requiring the lawyer to make a confiden-
tial record of the negotiations, for example, could have some beneficial
effects. Regardless of any such procedural changes, however, it seems
inescapable that an irreducible measure of trust, under the rubric of "pro-
fessional judgment," must continue to repose in the lawyer. This means
that negotiating settlements, a key function in our calling, is effectively
beyond regulation. That in turn should remind us that our calling is in-
deed a profession-that we as lawyers above all must be trustworthy.
Asbestos cases bring forward the question of lawyers' role in settle-
ment in a specially imperative way. As is well known, there are tens of
thousands of asbestos cases now pending in courts throughout the coun-
try. Other ten thousands of asbestos cases have already been resolved,
the overwhelming proportion of them by settlement rather than by adju-
dication. With the aging of the worker population that was exposed to
asbestos and asbestos products, the future will likely bring yet more ten
thousands of asbestos cases.
There is a special imperative to achieve settlement of these cases. The
"asbestos cases" are often thought to constitute a single category and
therefore to be appropriate for a common disposition. The cases all in-
volve similar origin and causation, a limited number of repeat defendants,
a limited number of plaintiffs' lawyers who have received the cases by
common pathways, a limited number of defense lawyers who have re-
ceived the cases by other common pathways, common background facts
* Professor Hazard delivered the annual Max M. Shapiro Memorial lecture on
October 27, 1994, at the Boston University School of Law.
** Trustee Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Director, American Law
Institute.
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relevant to liability, common injury etiology, and common problems of
insurance coverage. As the litigation has burgeoned, the claims have fall-
en into statistical categories whereby otherwise idiosyncratic personal in-
juries may be directly compared with each other in evaluations for settle-
ment. Claims processing has become specialized to the point where all
the lawyers, judges, and other professionals know each other. The sheer
number of cases with these similarities makes the asbestos cases distinctly
visible in court calendars, unlike automobile and products liability cases,
for example, which continue to be regarded as separate and unique.
The inevitable result of these categorical imperatives are endeavors to
settle the cases en masse. The procedure employed is a settlement class
suit. A settlement class suit is a proceeding brought after negotiations
between plaintiffs' representatives and the defense have concluded, in
which the purpose and effect of the suit is not litigation but a binding,
judicially approved contract that will govern all future cases.' The result
is called a "global settlement," signifying that it covers all claims by all
defined claimants against all defined defendants. For society, the court
system, and the involved professionals, a global settlement makes obvious
sense. Global settlement on anything like reasonable terms would also
benefit the victims. At minimum, settlement would mitigate the scandal-
ously high transaction costs entailed in litigating the asbestos cases-
something like two-thirds or three-quarters of the dollars going for pur-
poses other than to compensate the victims.2 Indeed, visitors from for-
eign countries would consider that even the thought of litigating these
cases is grotesque proof of American misguided faith in litigation as a
remedy for social ills.
Nevertheless, there are serious questions about these proposed settle-
ments. Objections in court have been made in the name of future claim-
ants whose rights are governed by the settlement agreements. These ob-
jections have been voiced by plaintiffs' lawyers who have represented
asbestos claimants over the years but who are not themselves participants
in the settlements. Cynics think that one motivation for objections by
these lawyers is the prospect of losing a rich income flow from the asbes-
tos cases-literally millions of dollars a year in so-called contingent fees
that will continue to flow as long as the play goes on. But academics of
standing have also voiced objections.
These objections are threefold. First, some argue that personal injury
1 See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 334-36 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (presenting a historical overview of how settlement class suits developed as a
partial answer to the asbestos litigation crisis, and discussing the court's approval of
the proffered Stipulation of Settlement in the case at hand), vacated, 1996 WL 242442,
at *22 (3d Cir. May 10, 1996).
2 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION 38-39 (Rand
Publications Series No. R-3042-ICJ, 1983) (noting that parties expended $770 million
in legal fees to recover only $236 million in compensation for asbestos plaintiffs).
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cases cannot be settled justly, or at least settled justly by the bunch.
Others argue that the settlements actually reached are unfair as defined
in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing class ac-
tions. That is, the terms are so far outside the range of reasonableness
that they cannot properly enjoy the blessing of court approval. Finally,
others claim that lawyers representing the plaintiffs in these cases violate
standards of ethics in negotiating these settlements. I will address all
three objections.
I. THE JUST SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS
The notion that parties cannot justly settle personal injury claims is ab-
surd, unless one takes the position that parties lack the capacity to con-
tract concerning their own interests. My colleague, Professor Owen Fiss,
appears to have come close to embracing this premise.' It is apparently
his view that the justness, certitude, and rectitude of judicial decision, at
least in cases involving civil rights, form the basis for ordering the future
that we should prefer to a compact resulting from party negotiation. It
seems to me that this view presupposes that judges as a group have a
sense of justice that Professor Fiss would find congenial-for example,
the sense with which Justice Brennan was endowed. We should call to
mind, however, that not all judges are Justice Brennan, not even those
who have reached the Supreme Court. If Judge Learned Hand was cor-
rect in "dread[ing] a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death,"4 then settlement has compelling relative attractions. In any
event, personal injury cases are in fact regularly settled as a matter of
course, and it is difficult to see why asbestos cases or any other class of
cases should be categorically excluded from this form of dispute resolu-
tion.
II. SETTLEMENTS AND THE RULE 23 STANDARD
The second objection to the global asbestos settlements is that their
terms are not fair under the standards required by Rule 23 for approval
of a class action settlement. The question, of course, is "fair as compared
to what?" Professor Eric Green of this law school was appointed guardi-
an ad litem for the class in the Ahearn litigation, another large-scale as-
bestos settlement class suit. The court charged Professor Green with the
duty of assessing the fairness of the settlement in that case under the Rule
3 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) ("Settle-
ment is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the
bargain may be struck by someone without authority .... Like plea bargaining, settle-
ment is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither en-
couraged nor praised.").
4 Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter (Nov.
17, 1921), in LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics: 1921-1922, at 89, 105 (1926).
5 See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
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23 standard. His report speaks to the issue of Rule 23 fairness with more
authority than I can invoke.' In any event, as I understand the law, the
legal standard of fairness under Rule 23 is more exacting than the legal
standard of unfairness from which one could infer that counsel represent-
ing a client has been inadequate in the representation.
A. The Law of Rule 23 Settlements
There are many statements of the law governing Rule 23 settlements.
The generally accepted formulation is both conclusory and redundant:
The settlement must be "fair, adequate and reasonable."7 Some courts
have developed a more elaborate formulation, seeking to specify in-
dependent "factors" for judges to weigh in application. Thus, in Parker v.
Anderson8 the court said:
In evaluating settlement proposals, six factors should be considered:
(1) whether the settlement was a product of fraud or collusion; (2)
the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the
stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4)
the factual and legal obstacles prevailing on the merits; (5) the possi-
ble range of recovery and the certainty of damages; and (6) the re-
spective opinions of the participants, including class counsel, class
representative, and the absent class members.9
I will not stop to dissect these factors. I only observe that they either
reiterate the concept of "fair, adequate and reasonable" or identify evi-
dentiary elements from which one might conclude that a settlement met
that standard, or refer to secondary sources that might evidence whether
the standard has been met. One may also observe that the factors do not
reference the negotiation technique employed, except to exclude fraud or
collusion, which in any event would vitiate a contract of settlement. The
factors also do not reference the relationship between initial settlement
proposals and final proposed terms, nor should they. If courts established
initial offers as an obligatory reference point, negotiators would simply
make extravagant formal proposals as a preliminary step to more serious
discussions. Finally, the factors do not reference the amount of the settle-
ment as such. This of course is appropriate. As nearly everyone recog-
nizes, when a judge is deciding whether to approve a settlement, the
amount of the settlement is the question and not the answer. Hence, we
are back to "fair, adequate and reasonable."
6 Report of the Guardian Ad Litem. Eric D. Green, Ahearn (No. 6:93cv526) (sub-
mitted Feb. 9, 1995).
7 E.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 207 (5th Cir.
1981) (citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977)).
8 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. Unit A), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
9 Id. at 1209 (citing Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1213-
19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979)).
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B. The Rule 23 Standard Relative to Other Settlement Standards
An alternative approach to understanding the law governing Rule 23
settlements is to compare the Rule 23 standard with the legal standards
that govern when an individual claimant seeks to set aside a settlement
contract or to avoid a settlement contained in a judgment dismissing the
individual's claim.
A claimant seeking to avoid a settlement, and thereby open the claim
to de novo consideration against the alleged wrongdoer, typically must
attack the contract of release in which the settlement is embodied. Here,
the law of rescission for fraud or mistake provides the standard for setting
aside the settlement.'0 "Fraud or mistake" in this context, however, ordi-
narily refers to fraud practiced or mistake induced by the opposing party.
Accordingly, to set aside a claimant's settlement contract with an oppos-
ing party on the ground of inadequate representation by the claimant's
own lawyer requires proof not only that the representation was inade-
quate, but also that the opposing party was legally complicit in that dere-
liction. Proof that will satisfy a court of such a conspiracy will be rare,
and properly so. If the standard of proof were not high, all settlements
would be in jeopardy of a change of heart by claimants who had agreed to
settle but then later thought better of it.
More typically, particularly for claims of substantial amount, a settle-
ment is documented in a judgment dismissing the client's claim rather
than simply in a settlement contract. The procedural mechanism for
avoiding such a settlement is a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or the counterpart under state practice, to set
aside the judgment." In this context the general standard is again fraud
or mistake, and again refers to fraud or mistake caused by the opposing
party.'
2
The problem addressed here, however, is the standard that applies
when the client complains, not against the opposing party for fraud or
mistake, but against his own lawyer for inadequacy of representation.
10 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (1981) (defining
fraudulent misrepresentation as a person's intent to make a false or factually unsup-
ported statement in order to induce agreement); Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342
U.S. 359, 362 (1952) (discussing the common law definition of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and finding a release of rights void when signed in reliance on deliberately
false, material information about its contents).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 78 (1982) (stating the procedural
rule for relief from judgment is by motion in the court that rendered the judgment).
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for... (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party."). See generally Mary K.
Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 41 (1978).
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The law is inhospitable to contentions that the complaining party was ill-
served by his lawyer. The decisions under Rule 60(b), governing relief
from judgments, indeed appear to have become even less hospitable in
recent years. The point can be made through a sample of judicial lan-
guage in cases where the client was innocent but his lawyer made a seri-
ous blunder.
Thus in Partee v. Metropolitan School District,'3 the lawyer represented
a teacher in claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, alleging racial dis-
crimination and violation of First Amendment rights. The lawyer had vir-
tually stipulated the plaintiff out of court by withdrawing a claim for per-
sonal liability against the school superintendent while failing to allege
that the superintendent's had acted pursuant to school district policy. 4
The stipulation left the client with no claim on which relief could be
granted. But the court nevertheless denied the client, who had retained
new counsel, an opportunity to present a restated claim:
[I]t was not excusable neglect for [plaintiff's] experienced counsel to
have misunderstood the distinction between "personal capacity" and
"official capacity."'"
In Taylor v. Texgas Corp. ,16 the defendant employer sought to set aside
a judgment that in effect paid compensation to an employee who was
already receiving a company pension for the very disability that was the
foundation of the suit. The defendant employer had failed to notice, and
its attorney had failed to inquire about, the fact that defendant's own
pension department was already paying the disability pension to the em-
ployee.' 7 The appeals court held that the trial court's grant of a motion
for relief-was inappropriate:
Given that [the employee] rightfully could have assumed that coun-
sel for [the employer] was aware that [the employer] was sending
[the employee] pension payments, [the employee's] conduct does not
rise to the level of fraud.'"
Then again, in Lepkowski v. United States Department of Treasury,'9
the court gave plaintiff no chance to pursue his claim against the Treasury
Department when his lawyer consistently, and with at least reckless disre-
gard of his obligations as an advocate, failed to file papers opposing the
Government's motion to dismiss and then, with equal persistence and
reckless disregard, failed to explain or justify that failure.20 Said the
13 954 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1992).
14 Id. at 455.
15 Id. at 458.
16 831 F.2d 255 (11th Cir. 1987).
17 Id. at 257.
18 Id. at 260.
19 804 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
20 Id. at 1312-13 (chronicling this attorney's inaction).
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court:
It was well within the bounds of the court's permissible discretion to
find that [plaintiff's] counsel had not even attempted to demonstrate
that his dilatory failings were the product not of mere neglect but,
rather, excusable neglect, for which his client should not be penal-
ized.2'
And, as a last example, in Nemaizer v. Baker2 2 the court refused to
relieve a plaintiff from his attorney's blunder in stipulating to a dismissal
of a federal action "with prejudice" when it was contemplated that plain-
tiff would then bring a suit on a different legal theory. 3 The court, hold-
ing that "with prejudice" precludes all subsequent litigation upon the
same cause of action, said:
[W]e have consistently declined to relieve a client ... of the "bur-
dens of a final judgment ... due to the mistake or omission of his
attorney .... ." This is because a person who selects counsel cannot
thereafter avoid the consequences of the agent's acts or omissions.24
Thus, courts have severely constrained the remedies for setting aside a
settlement on the ground of inadequate representation. 5 I have stated
my understanding that the Rule 23 fairness standard is more exacting
21 Id. at 1313.
22 793 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
23 Id. at 60.
24 Id. at 62 (internal citations omitted).
25 A final remedy potentially available to a claimant, that of legal malpractice, has
narrow scope as applied to negotiation of a settlement. The decisions in which plain-
tiff has survived a motion to dismiss have involved situations in which the essence of
the grievance is the failure to investigate facts that would form the basis for negotia-
tion, not failure in the actual negotiation process. For example, two leading cases
involve failure on the part of a lawyer in divorce negotiations to use reasonable dili-
gence to ascertain the extent of the marital property. Grayson v. Wofsey, 646 A.2d
195 (Conn. 1994); Malfabon v. Garcia, 898 P.2d 107 (Nev. 1995). The extent of mari-
tal property is of course the very framework of divorce negotiations. So also, failure
to transmit to the client a settlement offer that later proves more generous than a later
settlement offer, or a judgment suffered at trial, is a violation of an ethical obligation
and a basis of virtually per se civil liability. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCt Rule 1.4 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer
of settlement in a civil controversy ... should promptly inform the client of its sub-
stance unless prior discussions with the client have left it clear that the proposal will
be unacceptable."). Put differently, assuming that the lawyer can show exercise of
reasonable diligence in gathering the materials that formed the basis of the negotia-
tion, and that the settlement was not outside the limits embraced by plausible profes-
sional judgment, the client cannot establish the causal connection required for a mal-
practice remedy. For a further discussion of negotiation malpractice, see Chief Judge
Posner's analysis in Nicolet Instrument Corp. v. Lindquist & Vennum, 34 F.3d 453,
455 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting the difficulty of proving causation in such cases, as one
cannot label negotiation results as "wrong" or "right").
1995] 1263
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than the common law standard governing these inadequate representa-
tion claims. It follows that an attack on a settlement in a Rule 23 class
suit has greater scope and possibility. However, I now wish to explore an
essential difficulty inherent in all of these remedies. This is the problem
of proving that there was a causal relationship between the lawyer's al-
leged deficiency in conducting the settlement negotiations and the resul-
tant injury to the claimant-in other words, the problem of proving that
the client would have obtained a better deal if the lawyer had been more
effective.
C. Limits to the Rational Assessment of Settlements
The focal point of concern about the settlement process is whether the
lawyer has adequately and vigorously represented the client. The lawyer
in settlement discussions is in essence a negotiating representative. The
key question is whether there is some objective way of measuring the
performance of a negotiating agent. By this I mean some way of compar-
ing the outcome achieved by the negotiator with some external standard,
as distinct from evaluating it in terms of the negotiator's sincerity, com-
mitment of time, or other measure of "input" into the negotiations. Un-
fortunately, there are severe intrinsic limits to establishing any such stan-
dard.
1. The Inherent Conflict Between Client and Lawyer
First, one must recognize that there is an irreducible divergence of in-
terest, if not a legal conflict of interest, between client and lawyer. This
conflict exists both in class suits and in litigation where there is a client
who has directly employed the lawyer. Judge Henry Friendly explained
the essence of the divergence years ago in an analysis that is difficult to
improve upon. In Saylor v. Lindsley,26 Chief Judge Friendly wrote:
There can be no blinking at the fact that the interests of the plaintiff
in a stockholder's derivative suit and of his attorney are by no means
congruent.... The plaintiff's financial interest is in his share of the
total recovery less what may be awarded to counsel, simpliciter;
counsel's financial interest is in the amount of the award to him less
the time and effort needed to produce it.... The risks in proceeding
to trial vary even more essentially. For the plaintiff, a defendant's
judgment may mean simply the defeat of an expectation .... [F]or
his lawyer it can mean the loss of years of costly effort by himself and
his staff.27
26 456 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972).
27 Id. at 900-01; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-84 (1986) (discussing principal-
agent issues in the context of class and derivative actions); Bryant Garth et al., The
1264
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I explore this conflict in the context of class suits more fully below. 8 I
only mention the divergence of interest between client and lawyer here
for an analytic reason. At least with respect to major claims, claimants
almost always have counsel, because they recognize that ordinarily they
will do better with counsel than without. Claimants are thus compelled to
entrust negotiation to representatives whose interests diverge in some re-
spects from their own. The claimant cannot know whether a particular
settlement figure is really in his interest or merely in the interest of his
lawyer. Nor can the court. Nor, indeed, will the lawyer himself be able to
make the distinction in a way that is both honest and precise. Thus, the
divergence between client interest and lawyer interest is a variable to
which a court usually cannot assign a weight in comparing actual settle-
ment outcome with a standard of "fair, adequate and reasonable." For
this reason, it is an inherent limitation on the law's ability to monitor the
lawyer's fidelity and competence.
2. Indeterminacy Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Different
Negotiation Techniques
A further set of difficulties derives from the near absence of any solid
empirical evidence concerning the relative effectiveness of various meth-
ods of negotiation process and technique in the settlement of legal claims.
In professional lore we understand differences among "hardball," "stone-
wall," "conciliation," and so forth, yet we do not know when or how one
approach works better than another. The most careful evaluation of ne-
gotiation techniques is apparently that of Herbert Kritzer.2 9 The sub-
stance of Professor Kritzer's findings is that there is no demonstrable re-
lationship between technique of settlement negotiation and outcome of
negotiation. When it comes to negotiating settlement of legal claims, we
have a rich store of professional lore on how it should be done but very
little evidence about the effects of various procedures under various cir-
cumstances.3 0
Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of
Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 391-94 (1988) (testing Coffee's analy-
sis of the private attorney general against empirical data gathered from federal class
action suits in the Northern District of California).
28 See infra Part III.
I See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991); HERBERT M.
KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION (1990). See
also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settle-
ment: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 109 (1994) (hypothesizing
that psychological processes-including how litigants perceive, understand, and re-
spond to settlement-create barriers that preclude settlement in some cases).
30 See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on
Brokers and Deals, 19 LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 275, 299 (1994) (reviewing HERBERT M.
KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN
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3. No "Objective" Criteria of Settlement Fairness
There is a more fundamental difficulty in evaluating the fairness of a
settlement, a difficulty existing independent of the unavoidable conflict of
interest between lawyer and client, independent of negotiation technique,
and indeed independent of whether the attorney conducted the negotia-
tions on behalf of his client with perfect competence and fidelity. The
essence of this difficulty is that the objective value of a settlement is indic-
ative of unfairness in a settlement only in outrageously bad settlements.
Understanding this point requires an understanding of the economics
and dynamics of the negotiation of a settlement contract. A settlement is
a contract negotiated under unusually constrained conditions. The econ-
omist's concept of "free market" does not apply to settlements. There is
no "market freedom" because, by definition, the parties to settlement ne-
gotiations face the immediate alternative of going to trial if they exit the
negotiations." Moreover, there is no shared reference point as to the
value of the claim, such as "reasonable market price." Litigation claims
have no market in the understood sense of that term. The very object of
the negotiations is to arrive at a payment that will substitute for one that
might have been arrived at had market conditions actually existed.
With this limitation in mind, we understand that parties can arrive at a
settlement only if there is an area in which plaintiff will be better off by
settling for less than he might wish and defendant will be better off by
settling for more than he might wish. If there is no such area of mutual
advantage in a case, the case does not settle. Correlatively, as every trial
lawyer knows, a case can be settled only if there is such an area of bene-
fit.
32
As a prefatory matter, it is well to remember that the existence of an
area of mutual advantage itself depends on judgment calls rather than a
definite calculus. The lower boundary of an area of mutual advantage is
the amount a plaintiff's lawyer and client in fact are willing seriously to
think about accepting. Thus, do those on plaintiff's side consider the case
worth "at least" $100,000 or is the minimum figure only $50,000? The
upper boundary of an area of mutual advantage is the amount that a de-
fendant and its counsel in fact are willing seriously to think about paying.
Is the maximum "at most" $175,000 or could it be $250,000? Thus, the
area of mutual advantage is itself more or less indeterminable. However,
experienced lawyers form judgments that can converge. The settlement
ORDINARY LITIGATION (1991) and HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER:
LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION (1990)) (noting that in spite of criticism of
Kritzer's work, his work provides the "best information yet" about negotiation).
31 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 523 (3d ed.
1986) ("Settlement negotiations are a classic example of bilateral monopoly.").
32 It was apparently Melvin Belli who originally set forth this concept of a zone of
settlement in personal injury claims. See 1 MELVIN M. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 109,
at 748 (1954).
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area emerges when the boundaries come to be in discussable proximity.
When the boundaries do not come into proximity, a case goes to trial.
Except in unusual cases, the area of possible settlement is fairly broad.
That is, the settlement area consists of a wide band of different prices at
which it will benefit both parties to settle. This settlement area is known
in economics as the "cooperative surplus."
The key point for present purposes is that there is no inherently ration-
al basis on which to divide the cooperative surplus. Thus, for example, if
it is rational for both parties to settle anywhere between $100,000 and
$175,000, there is no rational basis for allocating the $75,000 difference
between them."3 Any division of the cooperative surplus would meet a
standard of "fair, adequate and reasonable."
This in turn means that there would be no rational basis for criticizing a
plaintiff, conducting his own negotiations, who settled for $100,001, nor
for criticizing a defendant who settled for $174,999. It also follows that
there would be no rational basis for criticizing a lawyer representing
either the plaintiff or the defendant for arriving at either figure. Thus,
any settlement figure within this area of "cooperative surplus" could not
be rationally criticized as being outside the bounds of reasonable profes-
sional judgment. Put differently, a settlement could be criticized as falling
outside the bounds of professional judgment only if it is one that no sensi-
ble lawyer, acting honestly, could have recommended.
It is also the case that the larger the costs of litigation, the greater the
indeterminacy of settlement possibilities. The "cooperative surplus" be-
tween parties is essentially equivalent to the transaction costs the parties
would incur by continuing the litigation of their dispute, plus the "price of
avoiding" the risk of an adverse determination. The latter is something
like the insurance premium on a unique risk-the kind Lloyds of London
handles, or used to handle. Accordingly, when litigation costs and out-
come risks are high, the zone of settlement is correspondingly larger.
And when the zone of settlement is relatively large, there is a larger zone
in which it is not possible to make rational criticism of the terms of a
settlement. In the asbestos cases, for example, the transaction costs are
approximately two-thirds or three-quarters of the parties' expenditures
for litigation. The range of reasonable settlement is correspondingly
large.
There are still further subsidiary difficulties. Available evidence indi-
cates certain irrationalities in people's determinations of a fair bargain.
Most people are risk averse, preferring a certain resolution to an uncer-
tain opportunity. As expressed in folklore, a bird in the hand is worth
two in the bush. People also tend to undervalue long-term transactions
3 See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19
LAW & Soc. INOUIRY 487, 496 (1994) (book review) ("Rational choice offers no theo-
ry of the particular proportions in which voluntary traders will divide a cooperative
surplus . . ").
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compared to transactions where there is a near-term payoff.3 4 A profes-
sional negotiator can moderate these irrational predispositions by under-
taking persuasion of his client based on his more extensive experience.
However, in the lawyer-client relationship the client legally has the final
say in settlement.35 That being so, there are limits to the influence that a
professional negotiator can bring to bear. There are corresponding limits
on the rationality of criticism of the outcomes realized through a profes-
sional negotiator. And this means that there are limits to rational second-
guessing of a settlement that a lawyer has recommended to a client.
Thus, although class suit settlements can be attacked on the grounds
that they do not meet Rule 23's gestalt "fair, adequate and reasonable"
standard, one would be severely constrained in trying to show that a set-
tlement was not in fact fair under that standard. The difficulty of making
such a showing reinforces the importance of lawyer self-regulation in the
area of settlement negotiation.
III. THE ETHICS OF CLASS SUIT SEiTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
The third objection to global settlements is that plaintiffs' attorneys vi-
olate standards of ethics in negotiating these settlements. I discuss these
considerations by first addressing ethical issues that arise in the settle-
ment of multiparty litigation in general, and then focus on the ethics of
the settlement class suit itself.
A. Multiparty Litigation
In cases having multiple claimants, whether class suits or simply the
product of multiple joinder, the interests of the members of the claimant
group in relation to settlement are likely to differ. Consider the simple
case of a single attorney representing three claimants: a wife driving the
family car, the husband who is the car's legal owner, and a passenger-a
child-in the back seat. All are injured in an accident with a defendant.
Each claimant's interest in the prospect of settlement typically will be
different. These differences will include their respective legal bases of
liability and vulnerability to potential defenses, measures of damages, and
aversion to risk of losing the case if it should go to trial.
Thus, the wife as driver is subject to a defense or mitigation for contrib-
utory fault. That fault may or may not be imputed to the husband-owner
under applicable law. It will not be imputed to the child. A statute of
limitations defense would certainly operate differently as to the child in
any event. It is unlikely that the claimants will have suffered the same
34 See id. at 513-15 (reviewing anomalous results of various intertemporal choice
experiments).
35 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1995) ("A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a mat-
ter.").
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character and severity of injuries-medical and rehabilitation expenses,
lost earnings, and pain and suffering-or have the same possibility of re-
ceiving punitive damages. The risks of trial usually will affect them very
differently, for example, if the child must look to settlement for long term
care while the parents look to it as something of a windfall for pain and
suffering.
However, a defendant typically will settle only if the settlement pack-
age includes all of the claims. A chief benefit of settlement from a de-
fendant's viewpoint is being spared the cost of defense and the risk of a
high adverse verdict. These costs and risks pro tanto remain open if the
entire case is not settled. Accordingly, the conflicting interests of the
claimants must be resolved if there is to be a settlement.
Under the prevailing rules of professional ethics, the plaintiff's lawyer
may mediate these conflicts and arrive at a settlement package, without
being subject to a conflict of interest, if he explains to all the claimants
the basis of the settlement as a whole and their individual share in it. 6
However, this can require some diplomacy and more. The complexity of
the negotiation among the claimants will be greater when they do not
have the tie of being in the same household. Additional complexities
arise if there is more than one lawyer involved in representation of the
claimants, for each lawyer's fee will depend on the award allocated to his
client. There are cases where a plaintiff's lawyer has conceded a share of
the fee in order to get all the claimants into line. In any event, the negoti-
ation is covered by the veil of the attorney-client privilege and hence or-
dinarily is beyond the purview of the court.
Perhaps it does not require repeating that there is no obvious basis on
which to allocate among multiple claimants the "cooperative surplus" of
settlement that goes to them as a group. That is, the indeterminacy of
fairness of a settlement as between a defendant and a plaintiff is com-
pounded by the indeterminacy of the fairness of the allocation of the co-
operative surplus among the plaintiffs. The question of fairness will be-
come an open issue, however, only if a claimant becomes so unhappy as
to protest.
Additional complexities are introduced when, as is often the situation
in a "big" case, there are multiple defendants and multiple sources of
insurance coverage. Only by coincidence could two or more defendants
have the same exposure in terms of the rules governing their liability,
their financial resources at risk, and their insurance coverage. In some
situations the case against one defendant can involve exposure to "bet the
ranch" liability, with a corresponding effect on the risk of going to trial.
For these reasons the interests of multiple defendants in a specific level of
36 Id Rule 1.8(g) ("A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not partici-
pate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims... unless each client consents
after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims...
involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.").
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settlement normally diverge. The same applies to the insurers who are
usually in the background. The insurers typically will have different mon-
etary limits, different coverages and exclusions, and different stratifica-
tions in their reinsurance.
These differences of situation result in different interests in sharing the
burden of a settlement that, in its aggregate terms, all would agree is
within the range of fairness. There will be a bargaining struggle among
those called upon to pay, similar to that among multiple claimants. Be-
cause separate defendants usually have independent representation, ar-
riving at agreement requires concurrence not only of the clients but also
among their lawyers. All of these complications are usually involved in
trying to settle a multiparty suit.
B. Class Suit Complications
The class suit presents further difficulties, in addition of course to all of
the foregoing ones. The additional complexities in class suits result from
the anomalous position of the plaintiff "client" and of the lawyers for the
class.
The plaintiff in a class suit is nominally a set of people who undertake
to act for others in prosecution, and possibly settlement, of claims owned
by the absentees. Thus, the class representatives do not speak only for
themselves but also are fiduciaries who speak for others, with the con-
straints that a fiduciary obligation imposes on their freedom of decision.
In the typical class suit, moreover, the representatives have no preexisting
relationship with the other class members, resulting in a distance that
puts additional strain on their fiduciary responsibility. The class repre-
sentatives are therefore required to reach a settlement that will meet the
standard of fairness on behalf of people they do not know, whose inter-
ests are inevitably divergent in various degrees, in negotiations with de-
fendants who themselves usually have divergent interests.
The position of class counsel is also different from that of counsel who
has been retained in the conventional manner. Counsel for a plaintiff
class is usually the architect of the suit itself.3 7 That is, plaintiff's counsel
will have been the author of the legal theory of the suit, the definition of
the class, the designation of the plaintiff representatives, and the strate-
gies to be pursued. Plaintiff's counsel typically will also be the producer
and financial backer of the enterprise.' The strength of the case, and its
potential for eliciting a settlement, will therefore be primarily a product
of the labors of class counsel. Whatever might be said about the rights of
class counsel according to the legal theory of class suit representation, in
37 See Coffee, supra note 27, at 681 ("In some areas of contemporary litigation, the
pattern is typically one of the lawyer finding the client, rather than vice versa.").
38 See id. at 683 ("[Ulnless the client is willing to invest in the action by bearing
litigation expenses, the attorney will still make the critical investment decisions, there-
by reversing the normal roles of principal and agent.").
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economic terms counsel has very legitimate interests in the settlement
proceeds.39
Viewed realistically, therefore, plaintiff's counsel has an interest in a
potential settlement that is substantially distinct from the interests of the
class itself. As such, he is an additional and important claimant to the
cooperative surplus in a settlement, notwithstanding that in formal legal
terms his position is merely auxiliary to that of the class. The presence of
this third-party claimant introduces an independent variable in appraising
the fairness of settlement for the members of the class. By the same to-
ken, it is a variable in the negotiation of how much and from whom a
settlement fund might be constituted.
On top of all of these complications is uncertainty as to whether the
suit is or is not a class suit. The key issue is whether the court certifies the
suit as a class suit. Whether a suit becomes a class suit, or merely involves
the permissive joinder of several individual claimants, usually determines
whether or not the case is "big." If the proceeding is a class suit-that is,
if the court certifies it as such-defendants can face massive liability. If
the court does not certify the proceeding as a class suit, the case reduces
itself essentially to a few claims, some of them of modest amount. How-
ever, a suit purporting to be on behalf of a class does not become such
until the trial court holds it to be so, and even then it is vulnerable to
dissolution on appeal or through collateral attack. This uncertainty
hovers over the process of settlement. Does the case involve $100 to $175
for each of the named plaintiffs, or does it involve similar amounts for
hundreds or thousands of claimants? The size of the cooperative sur-
plus-as a practical matter, whether there is any such surplus-turns on
this issue. The claims of the class members on the average may be much
larger, as in the asbestos cases-$5000 to as much as $500,000. This
"spread" between upper and lower limits of justifiable settlement is cor-
respondingly larger in dollar terms.
There are powerful restraints against making a firm judicial determina-
tion of whether the suit is a class proceeding or not. The Supreme
Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin' radically discouraged
such determinations prior to full-scale discovery. A defendant typically
does not want the case certified as a class suit unless it is fairly confident
of victory on the merits or has the terms of a settlement firmly in hand.
The uncertainty about certification is a bargaining chip, but for whom is
usually unclear.
39 See id. at 683-84 ("[Olne better understands the behavior of the plaintiff's attor-
ney in class and derivative actions if one views him not as an agent, but more as an
entrepreneur who regards a litigation as a risky asset that requires continuing invest-
ment decisions.").
40 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) (holding that a preliminary hearing on the merits of
a suit to determine whether it may be brought as a class action is not permitted under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23).
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It is the confluence of these factors that has begotten the "settlement
class suit." A settlement class suit permits the defendants' and plaintiffs'
counsel to determine the size of the controversy through a bargaining
process, and by the same process to resolve the controversy. Determin-
ing the size of the case and reaching resolution by settlement are interde-
pendent, and unavoidably so. The bargain determines the size of the
"pot," the shares of the pot to be awarded the claimants, or a formula for
determining their shares; the shares of the burden to be imposed on the
defendants and their insurers or a formula for that determination; and the
share to be given to plaintiffs' counsel as the "third man," so to speak.
Whether the result is "fair, just and equitable" is a question whose an-
swer can be clear only in clear cases, 4 ' no matter what words are used to
define the inquiry.
CONCLUSION
It may well be that settlements of many litigation claims are imprudent
in the sense that a different outcome might have been realized. It may
well be that many .settlements conducted by lawyers are the result of inef-
fectual or self-interested negotiation by the lawyers. The point holds not
only against lawyers for claimants who got too little but against lawyers
for defendants who paid too much. The legal remedies for such failures
are, however, very limited. In essence, the dissatisfied client has to prove
that his lawyer was guilty of fraud.42 The settlement process is therefore
a black box, structurally impervious to enlightened scrutinization from
without.
This conclusion is surely unsettling in a culture committed to the idea
that every legal wrong should have a remedy, a culture that also is not
inclined to be sparing of lawyers. Yet the conclusion seems inescapable.
If this is true, then the burden of moral responsibility in conducting settle-
ment negotiations must be recognized as correspondingly heavier.
41 For such a case, see In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 818-19 (3d Cir.) (finding a class settlement not "fair, reason-
able, or adequate" because of valuation problems and "lingering safety concerns," but
leaving open the possibility of approving a settlement on a more well-developed rec-
ord), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
42 This analysis suggests that the outcome, although not the analysis, in Muham-
mad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867 (1991), may make more sense than first appears. In that
case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a dissatisfied plaintiff cannot sue
his attorneys after a settlement to which the plaintiff agreed unless the plaintiff can
show that his attorney fraudulently induced him to settle the original action. Id. at
1348.
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